Ontario Police Law Update: Discipline, Human Rights and Suspension Without Pay
Recent decisions from the Ontario Police Arbitration and Adjudication Commission and the Divisional Court provide important guidance on deceit allegations, the interaction between WSIB and human rights proceedings, criminal convictions in police discipline, and suspension without pay under the Community Safety and Policing Act.
Inaccurate information does not automatically establish deceit
In Peel Regional Police Service and Constable Sagar Arora, released September 28, 2026, OPAAC dismissed all remaining allegations against Constable Arora and ordered his immediate reinstatement. Peel Regional Police had sought his termination based on allegations of deceit or misleading conduct and failure to perform duties.
The allegations arose from several separate incidents involving overseas travel, medical circumstances, leave requests, missed court appearances and daily activity reports. The Service argued that the incidents, considered together, demonstrated a pattern of deceitful conduct.
Adjudicator Elie Labaky was not satisfied that the allegations had been established through clear and convincing evidence. The decision confirms that an inaccurate statement does not, on its own, constitute deceit. A misunderstanding, mistaken belief, imprecise choice of words, poor recollection or failure to appreciate the significance of information will not necessarily establish misconduct.
To prove deceit under section 31 of the Code of Conduct, the employer must establish that the officer intended to mislead or deceive, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Suspicion or the existence of an alternative explanation is not enough.
The decision also draws an important distinction between misconduct and imperfect performance. An officer’s mistake, poor judgment or failure to perform a task perfectly does not automatically amount to a breach of the Code of Conduct. The conduct must meet the specific statutory requirements of the alleged offence.
The adjudicator was also critical of the manner in which unrelated incidents had been grouped together under broad counts. Each alleged incident still had to be examined on its own facts. Weak allegations could not be combined to create a pattern that the individual evidence did not support.
The decision is particularly useful where a police service attempts to transform inconsistencies, recording errors or unrelated performance concerns into a generalized allegation of dishonesty. It also recognizes that some concerns may be more appropriately addressed through supervision, coaching, training or progressive discipline instead of a section 202 proceeding seeking demotion or termination.
The adjudicator ordered the Service to reimburse Constable Arora for wages lost through any suspension without pay and to provide the support necessary for his reintegration.
A WSIB decision does not necessarily determine a human rights claim
The Divisional Court’s decision in McLeod v. Direct Coil Inc., 2026 ONSC 5369, addresses the relationship between WSIB proceedings and applications before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.
The HRTO had dismissed a human rights application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code because the underlying circumstances had also been considered through the WSIB process. The Divisional Court set that decision aside.
Although the proceedings shared a common factual background, the WSIB had expressly excluded the employer’s duty to accommodate from its consideration. The Court concluded that the WSIB proceeding had not appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights application. The accommodation claim was therefore permitted to continue before the HRTO.
This decision is particularly relevant to police members whose circumstances may give rise to parallel WSIB claims, grievances and human rights proceedings. A WSIB decision concerning entitlement, suitable work or return to work does not necessarily determine whether the police service satisfied its separate obligations under the Human Rights Code.
The proper analysis requires a careful comparison of the issues that were actually raised and decided in each proceeding. A shared factual background is not enough. If the WSIB did not decide whether the employer provided appropriate accommodation, delayed a promotion because of disability, imposed discriminatory employment consequences or otherwise contravened the Code, section 45.1 should not automatically prevent the human rights claim from proceeding.
Read McLeod v. Direct Coil Inc. on CanLII
Criminal guilty pleas cannot be relitigated through police discipline proceedings
In Toronto Police Service and Police Constable Ronald Joseph, dated September 23, 2026, the officer had pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Justice to three counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of public mischief. He received a 12 month conditional sentence.
At the subsequent OPAAC hearing, the officer pleaded not guilty to the related Code of Conduct allegation and sought to explain why he had entered the criminal pleas.
Adjudicator Ian Nordheimer held that the officer could not use the disciplinary proceeding to relitigate the criminal findings. The officer had confirmed during the criminal plea inquiry that his pleas were voluntary and that the agreed statements of fact were correct. He had not sought to set aside the pleas or appeal the findings of guilt.
Unless successfully challenged through the appropriate criminal process, a guilty plea and resulting finding of guilt cannot be attacked indirectly before OPAAC. The adjudicator therefore found the officer guilty of contravening section 4 of the Code of Conduct.
Importantly, the decision does not prevent the officer from relying on personal, medical or psychological circumstances during the penalty phase. Those circumstances may remain relevant to rehabilitation, mitigation and the appropriate disciplinary outcome even where the underlying Code violation follows from the criminal conviction.
Police members who intend to challenge a criminal plea or conviction should obtain advice promptly about the available criminal appeal or review process. Waiting until the disciplinary hearing will generally be too late to dispute the finding itself.
Suspension without pay requires an individualized decision and written reasons
The June 15, 2026 decision in Oehm has also received renewed attention. It provides important guidance on a chief’s authority to suspend a police officer without pay under section 210 of the CSPA.
Constable Oehm was subject to bail conditions that restricted contact with another officer and prohibited him from possessing weapons, including firearms. OPAAC accepted that the conditions substantially interfered with his ability to perform the core duties of a police officer. His suspension was therefore maintained.
However, the adjudicator set aside the decision to withhold his pay and returned that issue to the Chief for reconsideration.
The decision emphasizes that the statutory language is permissive. A chief “may” suspend an officer without pay when the statutory criteria are satisfied, but withholding pay does not follow automatically. It remains a separate exercise of discretion.
Suspension without pay was described as an exceptional administrative measure with serious consequences for an officer’s livelihood. The decision must be individualized and must fairly consider the officer’s circumstances, including the gravity of the allegations, risk, professional history and any changes to the applicable bail conditions.
Although section 210 does not expressly require written reasons, OPAAC held that procedural fairness requires them when pay is withheld. Written reasons allow the officer and the public to understand the factors considered and whether the discretion was exercised reasonably, objectively and fairly.
For police associations, the decision supports an immediate request for the chief’s complete written reasons whenever an officer is suspended without pay. Those reasons should demonstrate a genuine individualized assessment rather than treating the loss of pay as an automatic consequence of the officer’s suspension or bail conditions.
